Property Law—Homestead Exemption—A Beneficiary Interest Can Support a Homestead Exemption in Arkansas and a Look at Other Interests Sufficient to Support a Homestead Exemption. Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, __ S.W.3d __. by Williams, Seth
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 34 Issue 1 Article 6 
2011 
Property Law—Homestead Exemption—A Beneficiary Interest Can 
Support a Homestead Exemption in Arkansas and a Look at Other 
Interests Sufficient to Support a Homestead Exemption. Fitton v. 
Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, __ S.W.3d __. 
Seth Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Seth Williams, Property Law—Homestead Exemption—A Beneficiary Interest Can Support a Homestead 
Exemption in Arkansas and a Look at Other Interests Sufficient to Support a Homestead Exemption. 
Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, __ S.W.3d __., 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 173 (2011). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
PROPERTY LAW-HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION-A BENEFICIARY INTEREST
CAN SUPPORT A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IN ARKANSAS AND A LOOK AT
OTHER INTERESTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.
Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, S.W.3d
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. Husband and Wife each transfer their
respective shares of the marital home into separate revocable trusts as part
of their estate plan. They are both trustees and beneficiaries of their respec-
tive trusts. The couple then files for a divorce, but before the court grants
the divorce, Husband obtains a loan using his part of the family home as
security for the loan. As part of the divorce settlement, Wife receives Hus-
band's share of the home and deeds this share to her trust, which already
owns her other share of the home. Husband then defaults on the loan. Wife
claims a homestead exemption with respect to the home when the bank fo-
recloses on the property. However, the bank argues there is no exemption
because the trust owns the home. Thus, according to the bank, Wife owns an
interest in the trust, not in the property as required by homestead law.
Should Wife lose the home simply because she transferred it to a trust?
Due to the increased use of trusts,' this question presents an important
issue for estate planning, and its answer is critical to provide individuals
using trusts some certainty in their homesteads. The Arkansas Supreme
Court answered this question in Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock.2 In Fitton, the
court allowed the beneficiary of a revocable trust to claim the homestead
exemption.3 This decision led to confusion among lawyers, banks, and title
companies; as a result, many routine procedures, from executing the correct
deeds to obtaining the appropriate waivers, were called into question.
The homestead exemption provides protection to two groups of benefi-
ciaries.' First, the exemption prevents creditors from taking the family's
home if the family becomes insolvent.' Second, it protects immediate fami-
1. Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 191, 191 (2005).
2. 200Ark.280,_ S.W.3d _.
3. Id. at 8,__ S.W.3d at _.
4. Alison D. Morantz, There's No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and Judi-
cial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAw & HIST. REv. 245, 246
(2006).
5. Id.
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ly members after the death of the head of the family by ensuring that they
can continue to live in their home.6
This note discusses the latter form of protection provided by the ho-
mestead exemption. The discussion begins with the background of the ho-
mestead exemption,7 placing particular emphasis on Arkansas's homestead
exemption.8 This note then addresses the interests to which a homestead
exemption will attach.9 Next, it looks at the Arkansas Supreme Court's de-
cision in Fitton and explains how that decision further defines the interests
to which homestead rights attach."l The note then examines the law in other
jurisdictions that have decided cases similar to Fitton." Finally, the note
explains how Fitton affects banks, title companies, and lawyers. 2
II. BACKGROUND ON HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
While still an independent territory, 3 Texas began the homestead ex-
emption movement in 1839 as a way to attract new settlers. 4 In 1841,
Georgia and Mississippi followed, enacting the first homestead exemption
laws in the United States. 15 The homestead exemption spread to almost all
American states by 1858.16 This spread was facilitated by political groups
like the anti-slavery Liberty Party, which sought to diversify its appeal, and
the post-civil war Republican party, which supported the exemption to gain
support among white voters. 7 Today, all but two states have adopted some
form of homestead exemption. 18
6. Id.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. The United States did not annex Texas until 1845. Jean Carefoot, Narrative History
of Texas Annexation, TEXAS STATE LIBRARY & ARCHIVES COMMISSION WEBSITE (April
1997), http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/annexation/index.htmil.
14. Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States: Ac-
commodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-1880, 80 J. AM. HIST. 470, 470,
477 (1993); Morantz, supra note 4, at 252. Texas also used free land grants to recruit settlers.
Id.
15. Goodman, supra note 14, at 478; Morantz, supra note 4, at 253.
16. See Morantz, supra note 4, at 253-254. The states in the Far West region of the
nation were the slowest to enact homestead exemptions. Id. at 254. "Although California
enacted homestead exemption immediately after entering the Union in 1850, its neighboring
states did not begin to follow suit until the 1860s." Id. (citing Goodman, supra note 14, at
492).
17. Goodman, supra note 14, at 478-91 (listing Whigs, Democrats, Liberty Party, anti-
slavery leaders, Free-Soil Democrats, women's rights supporters, Republicans, and other
groups as supporting a homestead exemption at some point); See also Morantz, supra note 4,
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The idea behind the exemption centers on protecting the family's home
from an unpredictable economy. 9 The exemption helps provide the family
with the security of a home20 and promotes stability and independence by
21
assuring homeowners a place to live regardless of any economic situation.
Moreover, it encourages enterprise because homeowners do not fear losing
their home to creditors.22
Although homestead attaches to the property, it is not an encumbrance
on the land.23 Instead, it serves as an encumbrance on creditors 24 as it prohi-
bits them from executing on certain debts.25 The exemption generally ap-
plies to debts the debtor incurred both before and after the homestead is ac-
quired.26
Once a homestead attaches, it generally remains attached to the proper-
ty for the benefit of the owner until the property's use as a homestead is
demonstrably terminated.27 The divorce or death of a spouse does not cause
the homestead to terminate. 28 Some states do not require continuous occu-
at 254-55 (describing how the "homestead exemption became intertwined with several
broader social movements").
18. Morantz, supra note 4, at 255 n.37 (stating that Pennsylvania and Rhode Island are
the only two states that have not adopted a homestead exemption).
19. Goodman, supra note 14, at 470.
20. Jonathan D. Colan, You Can't Take That Away from Me: The Sanctity of the Homes-
tead Property Right and Its Effect on Civil Forfeiture of the Home, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 159,
163-64 (1994).
21. Ryan P. Rivera, State Homestead Exemptions and Their Effect on Federal Bankrupt-
cy Laws, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 71, 73 (2004).
22. Goodman, supra note 14, at 478 (According to Supreme Court Justice Hemphill,
"[t]he man who failed.., could readily 'commence again, Antaeus-like, with renewed ener-
gy and strength and capacity for business."').
23. RuFus WAPLES, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 102 (1892).
24. Id.
25. See George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. Rev. 1289, 1299
(1950); 97 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 678 (1949) "Social or economic policies which outweigh the
desire to protect the home dictate that many liabilities of the owner be enforceable against his
homestead because of the nature of the transaction out of which they arise." Id. Excluded
debts (not subject to homestead exemptions) generally include purchase money mortgages,
taxes and assessments, and liens from the repair or improvement of the property. Id.
26. Id. at 1300, 97 U. OF. PA. L. REv. 677, 678 (1949).
27. In re Kimball, 270 B.R. 471, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2001) (citing In re Jones, 193
B.R. 503, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995)); Accord Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462,
465 (Tex. App. 1981) (citing Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1972); Sulli-
van v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971)).
28. E.g., Middleton v. Lockhart, 344 Ark. 572, 581-82, 43 S.W.3d 113, 120 (2001)
(citing Jones v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 1085, 166 S.W.2d 1036 (1942); Butt v. Walker, 177
Ark. 371, 6 S.W.2d 301 (1928); Gray v. Patterson, 65 Ark. 373, 46 S.W. 730 (1898); Stanley
v. Snyder, 43 Ark. 429 (1884)).
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pancy for the homestead to continue, 29 and some states even require the
owner to have the intent to renounce and forsake the homestead in order for
the right to be terminated.3"
Homestead statutes usually limit the amount of the exemption, which
restricts the monetary value of the homestead.31 Generally, states have not
increased the limit to keep up with inflation.3 2 However, in states that place
restrictions only on the acreage of the homestead, the exemption is unli-
mited in value.33 Other states set the limitation depending on the location of
the homestead.34
A. General Requirements for the Homestead Exemption
While homestead exemption is established by state law and varies from
state to state, the laws generally require the owner to have a family, own
some interest in the land,35 and use the property as a residence.36 Some
states also require the homeowner to formally declare the property to be his
or her homestead.37
The family requirement relates to the traditional purpose of the homes-
tead exemption in providing stability for the family. 38 While the family re-
quirement originally required some sort of blood relation or support obliga-
tion,39 states have begun to extend the exemption to more than just tradition-
al families.4" Some states have extended the exemption to heads of house-
29. See generally Hammond v. Shipp, 289 So.2d 802, 807 (Ala. 1974) (allowing homes-
tead exemption when wife left homestead after she separated from her husband; they did not
divorce); Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d at 465 (allowing homestead exemption when husband left
the home during course of divorce).
30. See Monroe v. Monroe, 250 Ark. 434, 438, 465 S.W.2d 347, 349-50 (1971).
31. Haskins, supra note 25, at 1291.
32. See id. at 1293 (arguing value limits should not remain fixed) ("One thousand dol-
lars does not represent much of a home today, and has not for several years past."). See gen-
erally ARK. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4-5 (Arkansas's homestead exemption); See infra Part II.B for
an explanation regarding the confusing limitations and minimums of the Arkansas homestead
exemption.
33. Rivera, supra note 21, at 86-91 (highlighting Texas and Florida as two states that
allow for an almost unlimited exemption).
34. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4-5.
35. See discussion infra.
36. Haskins, supra note 25, at 1293.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also WAPLES, supra note 23, at 57.
39. WAPLES, supra note 23, at 58-60.
40. Some states have extended the homestead exemption to all persons. See In re Lash-
ley, 206 B.R. 950, 953 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.475(1) (1994)).
Other states only require that the person claiming the exemption be the head of a household.
See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
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hold.4 To determine whether one qualifies as the head of the household,
courts look to factors such as the individual's obligation to support those in
the home, the dependence of those in the home on the individual, and
whether the individual is in a role of authority.42 Other states have extended
the exemption to any resident4 3 or natural person.'
Homestead statutes generally require the property to be occupied as a
residence. 45 This serves the function of putting creditors on notice that the
land may be the occupant's homestead. 6 In some jurisdictions, it does not
matter if the land is used for any other purpose so long as it is used as a resi-
dence.47 Furthermore, homestead law does not require a set length of occu-
pancy.48
While most states only require the homeowner to occupy the property
as a residence, a few require a more formal form of dedication in addition to
occupancy. 49 In those states, formal declaration of homestead usually en-
compasses a notation on the deed or a separate declaration that is executed
and recorded. However, in some states that require dedication, failure to
dedicate does not always cause the owner to lose the exemption.5'
B. Arkansas Homestead
The Arkansas homestead law constitutes the entirety of article nine of
the Arkansas Constitution.5 2 The exemption applies to any resident who is
41. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (allowing either the family or the head of the family to
claim the exemption).
42. See In re Collins, 152 B.R. 570, 572 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992) (stating that the indi-
vidual does not have to be a parent but requiring the household to be more than a mere aggre-
gation of individuals).
43. See In re Fromal, 151 B.R. 730, 732 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (stating that Virginia's
homestead exemption extends to any "householder," meaning any resident of the state).
44. Colan, supra note 20, at 164. Following the purpose of the exemption, to protect the
home, Florida extended the exemption to any natural person. Id.
45. E.g., ARK. CONST. art IX, §§ 4-5.
46. Haskins, supra note 25, at 1297.
47. Id (stating that some courts have held that even if residential use is incidental to
business use, the occupancy requirement is still satisfied).
48. WAPLES, supra note 23, at 177 (stating that occupancy of only one day may be suffi-
cient to establish the homestead).
49. Id. at 160.
50. Haskins, supra note 25, at 1298; see e.g., IOWA CODE § 561.4 (2011) (requiring the
homeowner seeking the exemption to record the selected plat with the county).
51. E.g., IOWA CODE § 561.4 (2011) (failure to select the plat for the homestead does
not, by itself, mean the home loses its exemption status).
52. Arkansas has a homestead exemption statute that mirrors the constitutional exemp-
tion sections of the Arkansas Constitution. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-210 (LEXIS Repl.
2005).
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either married or the head of a household.5 3 The Arkansas Supreme Court
has interpreted the latter to mean that the exemption applies to any resident,
whether married or not, so long as he or she is the head of a household. 4
Furthermore, the law requires the person claiming the exemption to own and
occupy the property as a residence. 5
The Arkansas homestead exemption contains limitations on both the
largest and smallest share of land that can comprise a homestead. 6 The
exemption has minimums of eighty acres outside a city,57 and one-quarter of
an acre within a city, disregarding value.5 8 The exemption allows a maxi-
mum of 160 acres outside a city,59 and one acre within a city,6° subject to a
monetary cap of $2500.61 The maximum amount is practically irrelevant as
almost all homesteads in Arkansas are worth more than $2500; thus, the
minimum limitations provide the amount of the exemption because property
in excess of $2500 may be exempted up to eighty acres outside a city and
one-quarter of an acre inside a city.
62
III. REQUIRED INTEREST FOR A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION TO ATTACH TO
REAL PROPERTY
As previously mentioned, homestead exemptions require the person
claiming the exemption to have some interest in the land.63 This is generally
not a high burden to meet as essentially any possessory interest will satisfy
this requirement; 64 however, future interests do not meet this requirement.65
53. ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
54. See Monroe v. Monroe, 250 Ark. 434, 436, 465 S.W.2d 347, 349 (1971) (citing
Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9, 14 S.W. 925 (1890)).
55. ARK. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4-5.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 4 ("[I]n no event shall the homestead be reduced to less than eighty acres,
without regard to value.").
58. Id. § 5 ("[I]n no event shall such homestead be reduced to less than one-quarter of an
acre of land, without regard to value.").
59. Id. § 4.
60. Id. § 5.
61. See ARK. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4-5.
62. Robert Laurence, Mobile Homesteads, and in Particular the Exempt Status of Mo-
bile Homes Located on Rented Lots: The Laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah
Compared and the Principle of the Liberal Construction of Exemption Statutes Analyzed, 57
ARK. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (2004).
63. See Haskins, supra note 25, at 1294-95. This comes from the requirement of most
jurisdictions that the person seeking the exemption must have some "specified interest in the
property." Id. at 1293. See also WAPLES, supra note 23, at 108.
64. See Haskins, supra note 25, at 1295-96; White Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Wooster, 66
Ark. 382, 385, 50 S.W. 1000, 1001 (1899) (citing Robson v. Hough, 56 Ark. 621, 20 S.W.
523 (1892); Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9, 14 S.W. 925 (1890); Ward v. Mayfield, 41 Ark.
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The nature of the required interest revolves around the idea that the interest
must be enough that if not for the homestead exemption, then the interest
could be sold to satisfy one's debts.66
Depending on the jurisdiction, a leasehold interest may satisfy the ho-
mestead exemption requirements.67 A court in Nebraska held that a month
to month tenancy was sufficient to establish a homestead although a tenancy
at will could not support the exemption.68 However, a Florida court held
that a leasehold did not meet the requirements because a lease does not con-
stitute ownership. 69 Moreover, a tenant cannot claim a homestead exemp-
tion against the landlord after the expiration of the lease.70 In contrast, the
life tenant of a life estate does own enough of an interest to support the ex-
emption.7' The remainderman, however, generally cannot claim the homes-
tead exemption.72 Nevertheless, some states make an exception where the
remainderman is in exclusive possession of the property.7 3
94 (1883); Rockafellow v. Peay, 40 Ark. 69 (1882); Sims v. Thompson, 39 Ark. 301 (1882)
(holding that a life tenancy is enough of an interest to support a homestead claim).
65. Haskins, supra note 25, at 1295 (stating that as a general rule a homestead cannot be
claimed in a future interest even if the claimant is in possession under a lease).
66. See generally WAPLES, supra note 23, at 109 (explaining that absolute ownership is
not required to secure a valid homestead exemption).
67. See Robson v. Hough, 56 Ark. 621, 624, 20 S.W. 523, 524 (1892). See also In re
Hellman, 474 F. Supp. 348, 350 (D. Colo. 1979) (citing 89 A.L.R. 555 (1984) as supple-
mented in 74 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1960) (stating that a leasehold interest is supported by numer-
ous other jurisdictions)).
68. In re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843, 845 (D. Neb. 1951) (citing Howard v. Raymers, 89
N.W. 1004 (Neb. 1902); Rank v. Garvey, 92 N.W. 1025 (Neb. 1902)). The Foley court ana-
logized a month to month tenancy to a year to year tenancy. Id. (citing 1 HERBERT T. TIFFANY
& BASIL JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 170 (2010)).
69. In re Tenorio, 107 B.R. 787, 788-89 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). Florida requires that
the ownership interest be in real property, and it considers a year to year lease to be a chattel,
not real property. Id. (citing De Vore v. Lee, 30 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1947)).
70. WAPLES, supra note 23, at 115.
71. White Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Wooster, 66 Ark. 382, 385, 50 S.W. 1000, 1001 (1899)
(holding that a life estate interest supported a homestead exemption even though the life
tenant had possession through another tenant who leased the property from him). Id.
72. Middleton v. Lockhart, 344 Ark. 572, 580, 43 S.W.3d 113, 119 (2001) (citing
Brooks v. Goodwin, 123 Ark. 607, 186 S.W. 67 (1916)).
73. See Carolyn S. Bratt, Family Protection Under Kentucky's Inheritance Laws: Is the
Family Really Protected?, 76 Ky. L.J. 387, 398 (1987) (citing Howard v. Mitchell, 105
S.W.2d 128, 133-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936)) ("Kentucky follows the general rule that naked
possession, without any title, is sufficient to support a homestead claim as against all the
world except the true owner or one having better title."); see also Panagopulos v. Manning,
69 P.2d 614, 620 (Utah 1937) (holding homestead exemption was appropriate where the
remainderman had exclusive possession and occupancy).
2011]
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Courts have held that an equitable interest is a sufficient interest to
support a homestead claim.74 This includes those purchasing under a con-
tract of sale so long as they have possession of the land." This requirement
of a right to possession seems to be triggered when claiming any equitable
interest as the basis for the exemption.76
A majority of the states hold that a cotenancy interest in land, either as
joint tenants or as tenants in common, is enough of an interest for a homes-
tead exemption to attach.77 However, one cotenant cannot claim a homes-
tead exemption against another cotenant.78 A minority of states follow the
rule that homestead does not attach to a joint tenancy or a tenancy in com-
mon.79 These courts reason that the homestead exemption requires a specif-
ic piece of land, and the homestead cannot be carved out of an undivided
interest.80 A tenancy by the entirety is enough of an interest to support a
claim for a homestead exemption."'
IV. FITToN V. BANK OF LITTLE ROCK - A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IS ENOUGH
TO CLAIM THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IN ARKANSAS
Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock82 held that an individual who is the settlor,
trustee, and a beneficiary of a revocable trust can claim a homestead exemp-
74. Childs v. Lambert, 230 Ark. 366, 368, 323 S.W.2d 564, 566 (1959) (citing Watson
v. Poindexter, 176 Ark. 1065, 5 S.W.2d 299 (1928)).
75. See Watson v. Poindexter, 176 Ark. 1065, 1070, 5 S.W.2d 299, 301 (1928) (holding
husband's assignment of homestead property, which was under contract of purchase, void
when he used the home to secure a loan without wife's signature or consent).
76. See WAPLES, supra note 23, at 118.
77. See Haskins, supra note 25, at 1295-96. See generally Elms v. Hall, 214 Ark. 601,
603, 215 S.W.2d 1021, 1023 (1948) ("Arkansas follows the rule supported by the weight of
authority that a tenant in common or joint tenant may acquire a homestead in the undivided
premises."); Wuicich v. Solomon-Wickersham Co., 157 P. 972, 974 (Ariz. 1916) (allowing
heads of families holding a home as joint tenants or tenants in common served to further the
purpose of the homestead statute); Nelson v. Stocking, 121 P.2d 215, 216-17 (Kan. 1942)
(allowing a cotenant to claim one quarter of his 160 acre property as homestead).
78. See Cooley v. Shepherd, 225 P.2d 75, 77 (Kan. 1950) (citing Cole v. Coons, 178
P.2d 997 (Kan. 1947)).
79. See generally Kellar v. Kellar, 221 S.W. 189, 190 (Tenn. 1920) (holding that a te-
nancy in common between husband and wife cannot support a homestead claim); Henderson
v. Hoy, 26 La. Ann. 156, 157 (1874) (holding that an undivided one-sixth interest is "incor-
poreal" and thus "cannot be the object of the operation of the homestead act").
80. Wolf v. Fleischacker, 5 Cal. 244, 245 (1855). See also Bates v. Bates, 97 Mass. 392,
395-96 (1867) (reasoning that because a widow petitioned for the dower share of her hus-
band's estate, which created a tenancy in common, she could not later be assigned a separate
piece of the estate for her homestead).
81. Coleman v. Williams, 200 So. 207, 208 (Fla. 1941) (citing Menendez v. Rodriguez,
143 So. 223, 226 (Fla. 1932)); Waddy v. Waddy, 291 S.W.2d 581, 581 (Tenn. 1956) (citing
Jackson, Orr & Co. v. Shelton, 16 S.W. 142 (Tenn. 1890)).
82. 2010 Ark. 280, S.W.3d__
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tion in the residence that is part of a trust.83 The story of Fitton began in the
late 1800s when courts began to allow the homestead exemption to attach to
interests less than fee simple.' 4 To understand Fitton, this section will first
look at the Eighth Circuit's decision in Richardson v. Klaesson,85 which
predicted the outcome in Fitton.
A. Richardson v. Klaesson - The Precursor to Fitton
In Richardson, the plaintiff had a judgment against the Klaessons and
their family trust in the United States District Court for the District of Ha-
waii.86 When Richardson registered the judgment in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Arkansas, the Klaessons claimed the
property was their homestead.87 The Klaesson Family Trust owned the
property while the Klaessons occupied the property as a residence. 8 The
Klaessons were the settlors of the trust and trustees, but they were not bene-
ficiaries of the trust.89 They only occupied the home because they had a
contract with the trust that required them to live in the home.90
The Klaessons argued that an equitable interest or mere naked posses-
sion should allow them to apply the homestead exemption to property
owned by a revocable trust.91 The court agreed in part, stating that a benefi-
ciary interest or occupation with the permission of the owner would support
a claim of homestead under Arkansas law.92 However, the court said that
these did not apply because Richardson sought to execute on the trust's fee
interest in the property, not the Klaessons' interest.93 Thus, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Richardson set the stage for the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision in Fitton.
83. Id. at 7-8, _ S.W.3d at-.
84. See supra Part III.
85. 210 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 812.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 813.
89. Id.
90. Id. Per the terms of the contract, the trust could end the occupancy with only fifteen
days notice. Id.
91. Richardson, 210 F.3d at 813.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 813-14. The court concluded by stating that the Klaessons' right of occupa-
tion would be exempt as a homestead and that a purchaser of the property would be subject to
the Klaessons' right to occupy the home per the contract. Id. at 814. The purchaser could,
however, terminate the Klaessons' occupancy on fifteen days notice. Id.
2011]
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B. The Fitton Case
In Fitton, the Fittons originally owned their home as joint tenants with
the right of survivorship.94 Later, they each transferred their undivided one-
half interest into their respective revocable trusts as tenants in common.95
The Fittons eventually separated; however, Mr. Fitton, while still married,
obtained a loan that was secured "by the undivided one-half interest [in the
home] owned by his revocable trust."96 As part of the settlement agreement
in their divorce, Ms. Fitton received Mr. Fitton's interest in the home.97 She
deeded Mr. Fitton's interest to her trust, but she did not pay Mr. Fitton's
mortgage.98 A short time later, the bank foreclosed on the property, arguing
that because the trust owned the residence the homestead exemption could
not apply.99 The trial court found for the bank and issued a decree foreclos-
ing on the mortgaged interest.' Ms. Fitton appealed.01
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court first noted that in Arkansas,
neither the husband nor the wife can sell or encumber the homestead proper-
ty without the other spouse joining in the transfer."2 Because the bank nev-
er received Ms. Fitton's waiver of her homestead interest in the property,
Ms. Fitton still had a homestead right to the property when Mr. Fitton took
out the loan. 3
The court then looked at an Arkansas statute regarding property tax as-
sessment, which provided that the term homestead included "a dwelling
owned by a revocable trust and used as the principal place of residence of a
person who formed the trust."'" This statute lends credence to the Eighth
Circuit's determination in Richardson that a beneficiary interest in property
is enough of an interest for homestead to attach." 5 Finally, the court in Fit-
ton considered the reasoning in Richardson, along with decisions from two
94. Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, at 1-2, _ S.W.3d ____
95. Id. at 2, S.W.3d at .
96. Id., __ S.W.3d at
97. Id., __ S.W.3d at
98. Id., __ S.W.3d at
99. Id. at 2-3 __ S.W.3d at.
100. Fitton, 2010 Ark. 280, at 3, _ S.W.3d at__
101. Id., __ S.W.3d at
102. Id. at 4-5, _ S.W.3d at (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-403 (LEXIS Repl.
2003), which requires both husband and wife to sign the deed or the other spouse to convey
their homestead interest via a separate document in order for a sale or an encumbrance to be
valid against the homestead).
103. Id. at 9, S.W.3d at _. The bank received Mr. Fitton's waiver of his homestead
interest in the mortgage papers he signed. Id. at 2, _ S.W.3d at _.
104. Id. at 6, _ S.W.3d at (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-26-1122(a)(1)(B) (LEXIS
Supp. 2011)).
105. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1122(a)(1)(B); Richardson v. Klaesson, 210 F.3d 811,
813 (2000).
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other jurisdictions that also addressed whether beneficiary interests are suf-
ficient to support a homestead exemption, 0 6 and it held that a beneficiary
interest coupled with other statutory requirements 0 7 supports a homestead
exemption."'
The bank also argued that Ms. Fitton abandoned the homestead by
transferring title to the property to the trust.109 The court noted that the pre-
sumption is against abandonment of a homestead and that abandonment
depends on the intention of the owner."0 With respect to Ms. Fitton, the
court looked at the fact that she maintained the home as her residence,
which suggested that she did not intend to waive her homestead. 1
C. The Significance of Fitton
Fitton's significance stems from the increased use of trusts as an estate
planning tool." 2 If the court decided Fitton against the homeowners, many
Arkansans who placed the ownership of their homes in revocable trusts
would suddenly find their homes less secure. Moreover, the court's decision
in Fitton is consistent with the line of reasoning that a homestead interest
attaches to an interest that a creditor might seek to execute on in order to
satisfy a debt." 3
The Fitton decision also emphasizes the purpose of homestead "to pro-
tect the family from dependence and want."' " Moreover, the court fur-
thered the idea of liberally construing the homestead exemption for the pro-
tection of the family's interest.' Finally, this decision shows that modem
courts still recognize the need to protect the family's home.
106. The court cited decisions of Florida and Kansas courts, which will be discussed in
the next section. See infra Part V.B-C.
107. She was married at all relevant times, and she occupied the property as her resi-
dence. Fitton, 2010 Ark. 280, at 8, _ S.W.3d at_. See generally Haskins, supra note 25
at 1293 (discussing the traditional requirements for homestead).
108. Fitton, 2010 Ark. 280, at 8, _ S.W.3d at _ ("Mary Fitton was entited to a ho-
mestead exemption even though the title to the property was held by her trust").
109. Id.,__ S.W.3d at.
110. Id. at 8-9, __ S.W.3d at (citing Parker v. Johnson, 368 Ark. 190, 195, 244
S.W.3d 1, 6 (2006)).
111. Seeid. at9, S.W.3dat
112. See Foster, supra note 1, at 191.
113. See WAPLES, supra note 24, at 109-10.
114. Fitton, 2010 Ark. 280, at 5, _ S.W.3d at.
115. Id., S.W.3d at __
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V. CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS REGARDING A BENEFICIARY
INTEREST SUPPORTING A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
Other jurisdictions have considered cases with facts similar to Fitton.
Some jurisdictions have reached a holding similar to that of the Arkansas
Supreme Court while others have decided the issue differently. The deci-
sions that differ do so because the interest owned is not in the property but
rather in the trust, and the trust owns the property. This section examines
the decisions made by courts in Connecticut, Florida, and Kansas with re-
gard to the issue of whether a beneficiary interest can support a homestead
exemption.
A. The Bankruptcy Court of Connecticut's Decision in In re Estarellas
In re Estarellas"6 was a bankruptcy case concerning a debtor who
placed her home in a revocable trust." 7 The debtor was both the beneficiary
and the trustee of the trust, and the parties stipulated that the home was her
principal residence." 8 In her bankruptcy filings, she listed the home under
interest in a trust and claimed a homestead exemption based on Connecticut
homestead law."9
The bankruptcy trustee objected because the trust was the owner of the
home and argued the debtor could not now claim a homestead exemption
because the home was transferred to the trust via quitclaim deed. 20 In op-
position, the debtor cited a statute providing the definition of property in-
cluded property in which a judgment debtor had an interest that could be
assigned or transferred. "' The debtor claimed this definition indicated that
she maintained an interest in the property after transferring it to the trust.1
22
The court found the debtor's argument unpersuasive, stating that the
statute did not make the debtor the owner of the property. 23 Thus, the court
held the debtor's interest in the trust could not support a homestead exemp-
tion. 124
116. 338 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006).
117. Id. at 540.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 540-41. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352b(t) (1977) (allowing a homes-
tead exemption of up to $75,000).
120. In re Estarellas, 338 BR. at 541.
121. Id. at 542-43. See also CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-350a(16) (1983).
122. In re Estarellas, 338 B.R. at 542-43.
123. Id. at 543; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352a(e) (1977) (defining homestead as a
home that is "owner-occupied").
124. In re Estarellas, 338 B.R. at 543.
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B. The District Court of Appeals of Florida's Decision in Engelke v. Es-
tate of Engelke
In Engelke v. Estate of Engelke,'25 the decedent's son became the suc-
cessor trustee to the decedent's trust, which contained an undivided one-half
interest in the decedent's home and cash. 126 The trust instrument provided
that the trustee was to pay the expenses of the decedent's estate if the resid-
uary proved insufficient to do so.'27 The personal representative of the de-
cedent's estate moved to compel the son to pay the charges. 2 ' The son re-
sponded that the trust's liquid assets could not pay the charges, and the resi-
dence was a homestead.'29 The trial court ordered the son, as trustee, to pay
the charges.130
On appeal, the son argued the one-half interest in the residence held by
the trust was constitutionally protected as a homestead.' 3' The court looked
at Florida's homestead law, which provides that the homestead interest sur-
vives the death of the original owner of the homestead to pass to the surviv-
ing spouse or heirs."' Also, the court noted that Florida courts have applied
the term "heir" to mean anyone within the class of people who are addressed
in the state's intestacy statutes. 33 The court then stated the decedent's right
of revocation while he was alive allowed him to maintain ownership of the
home despite the fact that title was in the name of his trust.'34 This meant
the decedent had a homestead while he was alive that, according to Florida
homestead law, survived his death and passed to his heirs.'35
At the end of the opinion, the court commented on the case's signific-
ance to the use of trusts for the purpose of holding title to homes:
Here, [the decedent] used a revocable living trust to hold title to
his homestead. We do not think that the use of the trust removes the
homestead protection to his heirs, to whom the property ultimately
passes. Revocable living trusts are widely used will-substitute devices
that provide flexibility in managing the settlor's assets during his or
125. 921 So. 2d693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
126. Id. at 694-95.
127. Id. at 694.
128. Id. at 695. The charges included the court-ordered allowance for the wife. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Engelke, 921 So.2d at 695,
132. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4).
133. Id. at 696 (citing Snyder v. Davis, 609 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. 1997).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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her lifetime. In other contexts, revocable trusts are treated similarly to
wills.
36
C. The Kansas Supreme Court's Decision in Redmond v. Kester
In Redmond v. Kester,137 the Kesters transferred title to their home to a
revocable trust using a quitclaim deed. 138 Mrs. Kester was the trustee of the
trust while both Mr. and Mrs. Kester were beneficiaries. 139 They eventually
filed for bankruptcy, claiming a homestead exemption for the home. 140 The
bankruptcy trustee objected, but the court held the homestead exemption
was valid despite the fact that the home was part of the trust. 14' The trustee
appealed to the bankruptcy court appellate panel, which affirmed the lower
court's decision. 142 The trustee appealed again, and the Tenth Circuit certi-
fied the question for the Kansas Supreme Court.143  The specific question
before the Kansas Supreme Court was whether a debtor who is the settlor
and the beneficiary of a revocable living trust may claim a homestead ex-
emption for real property placed in the trust.'44
The Kansas Supreme Court began its analysis by looking at Kansas
cases that discussed the interest necessary to support a homestead exemp-
tion. 145 The court held that, in Kansas, any interest in real property supports
a homestead exemption.'46 This left the court with the question of "whether
a trust beneficiary has any interest in real estate held by the trust.' 47 The
court determined that a beneficiary holds an equitable interest in the real
property of the trust "regardless of whether the beneficiary is also the settlor
and the trustee of the trust.' 148 Because an equitable interest is enough to
support a homestead, the court found that a beneficiary has a sufficient in-
terest to support a homestead exemption. '49
To support its finding, the court looked to a Kansas statute, 50 which
provides that if a settlor is a beneficiary of a trust, transferring property to
136. Id. at 697.
137. 159 P.3d 1004 (Kan. 2007).
138. ld. at 1006.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Redmond, 159 P.3d at 1006.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1007-09.
146. Id. at 1009.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Redmond, 159 P.3d at 1010.
150. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-1 107 (2004).
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the trust does not affect the homestead exemption. 5' However, the statute
also requires that such transfer take place via warranty deed.'52 While the
transfer here was done by quitclaim deed, the court found that the statute
showed the intent of the legislature to construe the ownership requirement
broadly.'53 Also, the court recognized the idea that an interest sufficient for
execution by a creditor to satisfy debts is an interest sufficient for homestead
exemption. "'
VI. WHAT Now?
Although the decision in Fitton provides some certainty to estate plan-
ners, it also creates confusion for banks, title companies, and lawyers.
Banks must now decide how to best ensure that their mortgages attach to
homes. Title companies must research beyond trust ownership to ensure
homeowners waived their homestead interest when necessary. On the other
hand, lawyers must consider how clients will retain their homestead exemp-
tion while also carrying out the clients' plans for their homes. This section
will first look at the problems banks and title companies face in determining
whether a homestead interest still exists. Then, the section will turn to law-
yers' problems in drafting trusts and related documents to ensure the trust is
structured to carry out the settlor's plans.
A. Banks and Title Companies
Banks must now obtain both the husband's and the wife's waiver of
homestead when making loans for homes that are part of a trust even if both
spouses are not the trustees of the trust. This extra step solves the situation
in Fitton because in that case, the bank only obtained the husband's waiv-
er. '55 However, a loan agent may not know if there is a spouse, or the situa-
tion could be like the one in Fitton where the couple is in the middle of a
divorce.
The Fitton decision also complicates the job of title companies as they
must now conduct more research when a trust owns the family's principal
residence. Title companies can no longer rely on the fact that a trust cannot
claim a homestead exemption because trusts cannot marry or fulfill a role as
the head of a household. Thus, title companies must ensure that both spous-
151. Redmond, 159 P.3d at 1010 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-1107 (2004)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1011 (stating that "if a debtor's interest in real estate is sufficient to include the
real estate in the bankruptcy estate, it is also sufficient for the application of the homestead
exemption as long as the debtor occupies the real estate").
155. See Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, at 2, _ S.W.3d _,_
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es waived their homestead rights when the real property subject to a homes-
tead exemption was transferred to the trust; otherwise, they must obtain the
waivers. Additionally, title companies must be cautious of situations like
Fitton where a couple splits their undivided one-half interests into separate
trusts because each spouse must waive their right to homestead with respect
to the other's undivided interest. This means that title companies will need
to be more diligent in their searches when the home is owned by trusts. If
title companies fail to ensure that both the husband and the wife waive their
homestead interest, title companies may face liability for any issues con-
cerning defects in title or for the unenforceability of a mortgage lien against
the property.
B. Lawyers
When lawyers advise clients, they must pay particular attention to resi-
dences that are owned by trusts. Lawyers must ensure that both husband
and wife waive their homestead interest either when they transfer their resi-
dence to the trust or when the trust sells the home. Moreover, lawyers must
consider whether inchoate dower applies to a home owned by a revocable
trust just as homestead now attaches to homes in revocable trusts. While
this issue is not addressed in Fitton, the reasoning in Fitton may be extended
to allow a claim of inchoate dower when a home held in trust is sold to a
third party.
In Arkansas, lawyers should also be aware of the transfer of property
through a beneficiary deed.156 Arkansas law with respect to beneficiary
deeds is codified in the Arkansas Code at section 18-12-608:
A beneficiary deed is a deed without current tangible consideration that
conveys upon the death of the owner an ownership interest in real prop-
erty other than a leasehold or lien interest to a grantee designated by the
owner and that expressly states that the deed is not to take effect until the
death of the owner. 15
7
As provided in the statute above, a beneficiary deed transfers property
to a chosen beneficiary on the death of the owner. 158 Therefore, the property
avoids probate. 59 These deeds are recorded, which makes them easier to
track than trusts. 60 Moreover, like revocable trusts and wills, these deeds
156. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-608 (LEXIS Repl. 2003) (establishing a beneficiary
deed); Christopher Barrier, The Uncertain Gift: Arkansas' New Beneficiary Deed, ARK.
LAWYER, Spring 2006 20, at 20.
157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-608(a)(l)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2011).
158. Barrier, supra note 156, at 20.
159. Id.
160. See id.
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can be revoked or the beneficiary changed.' 6 ' To revoke or change the deed,
the owner must execute and record a new deed or revocation before his or
her death. 162 In the case of multiple beneficiary deeds for the same property,
the most recently signed deed is effective at the grantor's death.'63 A bene-
ficiary deed cannot, however, be revoked or changed by decedent's will.'
64
A beneficiary deed that names the trust as the beneficiary allows the
owner to maintain complete control over the residential property during his
or her life, including retaining the homestead exemption, as long as the other
conditions are met. At the owner's death, the property avoids probate and
transfers to the trustee. This seemingly accomplishes the same goals as
transferring the residence to a revocable trust during the owner's life as the
home will still be distributed according to the rules of the trust upon the
death of the homeowner. Moreover, the Arkansas Code provides a sample
form for a beneficiary deed as well as a sample form for a revocation of a
beneficiary deed.'65
However, the beneficiary deed option is not without drawbacks. First,
because beneficiary deeds are new to Arkansas, case law regarding such
deeds is sparse. Furthermore, the surviving spouse's homestead still attach-
es to property at the death of the other spouse. Thus, the surviving spouse
still has a homestead interest in the property upon the death of the owner
even if the owner executed a beneficiary deed prior to his or her death. Be-
neficiary deeds may also cause problems in obtaining title insurance.'66
Title companies must develop guidelines to handle having a beneficiary
deed in the chain of title. 6
7
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fitton decision provided more certainty to individuals using trusts
as part of an estate planning by ensuring that their home would continue to
be exempt from execution for debt even when the home is owned by a trust.
Moreover, Fitton furthered the purposes of homestead-stability and securi-
ty of the home. Additionally, the court decided Fitton in accord with the
historical idea that the homestead exemption attaches to any interest in a
principal residence that a creditor might seek to execute in satisfaction of a
debt. This decision provides a basis for lower courts to determine which
interests are sufficient to support the exemption. However, the decision did
161. Id.
162. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-608(d)(2).
163. Id. § 18-12-608(e).
164. Id. § 18-12-608(d)(4).
165. Id. § 18-12-608(g).
166. See Barrier, supra note 156, at 25.
167. Id.
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not provide much guidance to banks and title companies, and it left lawyers
with questions regarding how to proceed. In sum, Fitton provided relief to
homeowners while leaving more experienced groups with questions con-
cerning how to protect themselves.
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